The Snapshot vote for CUIP-015 - Staking Emission Reduction has concluded, with 56.50% voting against the proposal and 43.50% voting in favor. This is equivalent to 100,605,460 votes, or 55.33% of our total voting population. The relatively narrow margin between the voting options compelled us to examine the voter distribution more closely. Only 95 wallets (13.46%) voted against the proposal, while 611 wallets (85.54%) voted in favor of the proposal. Given that the majority of DAO members support reducing staking emissions, we felt it was necessary to reopen the dialogue on reducing the staking emissions.
Motivation
After reading through the forum and Discord discussions we have modified the original proposal in the hopes of alleviating some community concerns with CUIP-015. We believe that the changes to this proposal provide a compromise while still allowing us to achieve the original goal of reducing emissions to prepare our community for growth.
Details
The new proposal shall:
Reduce the weekly RBW emission for single-side staking by 60% (690,410 → 276,164)
Maintain the same weekly RBW emission for RBWLP staking (78,211 → 78,211)
Current
This Proposal
CUIP-015
Weekly RBW Emission (Staking)
690,410
276,164
172,602
Weekly RBW LP Emission
78,211
78,211
156,422
This will result in a net reduction of 414,246 RBW weekly.
Please Note: The overall allocation of RBW to staking remains the same.
Conclusion
We continue to believe that the first half of 2023 will be crucial for the CU DAO. This proposal best positions Crypto Unicorns for the launch of Jousting, Unicorn Party, TeamRPG, Tribes, and other features in 2023. We request that the community vote in favor of this.
I must say, when I received the first reply notification to this proposal, I was ready to prepare my thesis on why this is a good idea only to see this response. Gave me a chuckle, thank you.
Although I voted in favour of the previous proposal, I am strongly against this, for 3 main reasons:
What’s the point in having a DAO if LG will just overrule votes where they don’t like the results? It’s not like this is a vote to empty the treasury and send all to the burn address (which obviously would require intervention). I can see your logic re: amount of wallets voting for and against, but it’s not ok imo.
Why make what looks to be a compromise to whales that defeats the purpose of the more important point of the proposal, i.e. to increase the rewards to the RBW/ETH LP? How this reads to me is that you wanted to find a compromise that keeps the staked whales happy, whilst also finding a way to decrease RBW emissions - this may have been achieved, but all this does is screw all of us by not causing the size of the LP to increase, and continuing to allow lazy/scared stakers to earn RBW and continue to dump. Are you scared they’re all going to dump after unlock? Just let them go and be done with it, RBW price is so low now that another 99% drop really doesn’t matter to anyone whose been in since Day 1 and is still active.
Why not give us the options to choose before this goes to proposal? E.g. reduce staking by x% and increase LP rewards by y% - this way interested parties can complete a poll that would hopefully lead to some sort of consensus, so that this sort of thing doesn’t happen again? I do appreciate the amount of participation that LG encourages from the community, and this DAO has been pretty functional till now, but I feel like LG should either give us more, or less, input at the proposal phase.
At the onset, everyone knows that we’re working on progressive decentralization. Voting power is based on sRBW which the LG+Team has majority of at the beginning. This will change as RBW unlocks and gets disbursed. In case you missed this, here’s the introduction article for when we founded our governance system. Governance — Phase 1. Fellow Unicorns, let’s dive into our… | by Laguna Games | Medium
This is a compromise with the community feedback, not with the whales per se. Contrary to what you’re saying, we understand if people decide to exit when this proposal passes. As for the reasoning behind this, this proposal provides a cleaner reduction that allows us to easily reassess the cause and effect in the future as opposed to pulling multiple levers.
Will vote yes for reasons stated in the AMA on February 21st, but I strongly believe a 70-90% reduction in staking emissions would put us in a much better place moving forward. We are seeing how difficult it is to get these proposals through, so I would rather implement an OVER reduction and correct it thereafter than the other way around.
Critical times for CU. Let’s right the ship, exciting year ahead!
Let’s hope 60% does what it needs to do for now. Other than using sRBW for the DAO, we could do without staking if you ask me.
But that’s not a popular view, so I’ll leave it at that.
Given that the total available RBW is not changing but emissions to stake holders is being reduced… Where is the delta going to be held and what will be done with it? How will it be used to “grow” the community (the stated goal of the proposal)?
Secondly, why not include in the proposal the rule on when/how the emissions will be returned? For example, once MAU/WAU is > XYZ the emissions will change by ABC. This shows that the goal is to grow users AND benefit the staking community. Otherwise, this proposal is simply a way to reduce emissions and hurt the investor without proof that LG/Delphi wants to return the emissions back to the investors in the future.
I will continue to vote against this proposal until there is a firm commitment to the investors (both big and small).
It’s in the “Please note:” section of the proposal. It’ll stay within the allocation.
The growth is expected to happen as a consequence of a healthy-looking ecosystem.
So that proper cause and effect can be reassessed at a later time. As @KeizerMc also said, the DAO can put forward another proposal a later time based on how we’d be trending after.
I was in favour of the first proposal too, even though I have a decent staked amount. The shift in the current one should help alleviate some of the concerns of the No voters.
I am sure this proposal will help CU skyrocket, along with Jousting and marketing initiatives.
Team made the right decision to step in and vote on this crucial matter: our DAO is young and sometimes we let ourselves lead by emotions or self-interest. Like in life, parents have to guide the children path until it can take decisions on his own.
However, there is no way to state that this proposal will cause user growth, in fact the only guarantee is that it will undermine the confidence of the investment community. Without having a defined strategy on the allocation treasury, treasury management definition, treasury release rules (when), and how that distribution will be handled; this proposal (like the previous) unnecessarily increases the risks to the investment community which means that most/many will likely move away from RBW Staking for other more stable options.
While I understand the need for this proposal and in general I am willing to vote FOR it. I am strongly against any proposal that undermines the confidence in either the gaming (users, which is where our focus should be) or the investment communities.
Should the proposal be amended with a re-entry and distribution policy statement that is enforceable, then I will vote FOR the modified proposal. Otherwise, I am AGAINST it.
However, my voting intention may not mater if I end up selling my staked RBW which come due in a couple of days.
@RndoCmndo1793 I’m glad to see that you’re not against with reduction itself. I appreciate that.
As for your other thesis, I’m afraid we’ll just have to agree to disagree. The DAO may write a proposal to review this again at a later time once we have enough time to assess the result of this proposal. It’s still up to the DAO what to do next. I’ll keep what you said in mind but for now, I can only encourage to review our thesis on building a DAO and how we wish to follow the path of progressive decentralization.
The community has already rejected a similar proposal by the team to reduce staking rewards.
This proposal is unfavourable to investors, and favourable to the team and seed investors.
I believe the proposal from RXIS is a mutually acceptable solution.
“In order to move towards a mutually acceptable solution, I believe a possible solution would be for the team and investors to further extend the timelock by the same amount as the requested staking reduction (so if the proposed staking reduction is 75%, the timelock should be increased by 75%). This would divide the burden equally while not unjustly benefiting certain parties over others.” - RXIS
The team have stated that they will use their tokens to vote for this proposal. Investors who bought RBW during and shortly after the IDO at higher prices are down 95-99%. Many new investors have locked their tokens for up to a year. Is it fair for the team to drastically reduce their staking rewards against their will?
The real issue is that there is a lack of demand for the token. If team want the price of the token to appreciate, they should deliver a good product, do affective marketing and list on exchanges.
Hi IgNanessa - thanks for the reply, I would disagree/challenge parts of what you said, but this doesn’t seem like a battle that can be won, so I’ll let it go.
